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Farmers in the IP Wrench - How Patents
on Gene-modified Crops Violate the Right
to Food in Developing Countries
By PETER STRAUB*
INTRODUCTION
Upon entering into force on January 1, 1995, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)
brought the global protection of intellectual property rights to an
unprecedented level. Very soon it became clear that its provisions and the
implementation thereof were difficult to reconcile with numerous
economic, social and cultural human rights. One example of such a
conflict was the dispute between South Africa and American- and
European-backed pharmaceutical industries over South Africa's right to
allow cheap parallel imports of patented AIDS medicine. Another example
was the U.S.-Brazil dispute over compulsory licensing of AIDS medicine
in Brazil. The attention of legal scholars consequently focused on the
incompatibility of TRIPS provisions with the right to the highest attainable
standard of health care pursuant to Articles 12(1) and (2)(c) of the CESCR.
A major goal of the United States during the TRIPS negotiations was
to obtain intellectual property protection for its agricultural biotechnology
industry.' In North America, and around the world, the economic effects of
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University of Hanover, Germany. Between 1997 and 1999 he studied Law at the Philipps-
University of Marburg, Germany, where he passed the First State Examination in Law. In
2002 he passed the Second State Examination in Law. Between 2002 and 2004 he worked
for different law firms in Singapore and China. From 2004 to 2005 he studied at the
National University of Singapore, where he graduated as Master of Laws with a
specialization in International and Comparative Law. He currently practices as an attorney-
at-law in Hanover, Germany. This is his first publication.
1. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property Engineering: The Role of the Chemical,
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL
RESOURCEs 274 (Burton Ong ed., 2004).
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strengthened intellectual property rights on genetically engineered (GE)
crop plant varieties have raised concerns of farmers and non-government
organizations. Unfortunately, they seldom argue within the framework of
internationally recognized human rights. Instead, they make reference to
rather fuzzy values, such as "food sovereignty."2
The term "food sovereignty" was coined in 1996 by Via Campesina,
an international NGO concerned with farmers' rights.3 It is supposed to be
"the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to
produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity. '4
First of all, the content of this right is unclear, as today there are hardly any
countries that are not, to a certain extent, dependent on food imports. The
inherent structural weakness of this approach is, however, that "food
sovereignty" does not represent a recognized human right. It is, rather, the
product of what Michael Ignatieff calls "rights inflation," meaning the
"tendency to define anything desirable as a right. "5 There exists, however,
considerable overlap between the claim for "food sovereignty" and the
content of recognized human rights. Whenever "food sovereignty" is
infringed, human rights such as the right to self-determination and the right
to adequate food might be violated as well. Farmers and NGOs can
strengthen their case against patents on crop plants by applying, whenever
possible, a recognized human rights framework instead of self-proclaimed
new rights.
This essay aims to apply a human rights framework to the problem
and to demonstrate that an overly strong protection of intellectual property
rights on food crops can violate the human right to adequate food. The
conflict is primarily between the farmers' right to adequate food and the
commercial interests and intellectual property rights of transnational
corporations. States, as the primary addressees of human rights, are only
indirectly involved. The CESCR places an obligation on member States to
work towards the progressive realization of socio-economic rights,
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bravo, Food Sovereignty and Genetically Engineered Crops, in
VOICES FROM THE SOUTH - THE THIRD WORLD DEBUNKS MYTHS ON GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED CROPS 29 (Ellen Hickey & Anuradha Mittal eds., 2003), available at
<www.foodfirst.org/pubs/other/voices/tocandintro.pdf>.
3. Stefan Flothmann & Juergen Knirsch, People over Profit: WTO and GMOs in the
Context of Food Security, Food Safety and Sovereignty, in WORLD TRADE, FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE - A LOOK AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS AND THE ISSUE OF FOOD SECURITY 68 (The Heinrich B611 Foundation ed., 2001),
available at <www.boell.org/docs/WTO-Food-GMO.pdf>.
4. Id.
5. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 90 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 2002).
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including the right to food.6 Because the patents and other intellectual
property rights in question exist only subject to national legislation, States
have to balance the different economic interests in their IP legislation and
agricultural policies in a way that promotes the realization of the right to
adequate food.
Part I of this article uses cases from North America to discuss the
impact of GE crops on farming practices. It will then explore the likely
effects on small farmers in developing countries. Part II discusses the right
to adequate food and how it is affected by the findings in Part I. Part III
examines the possibility of intellectual property as a human right. Such a
right is often invoked to give legitimacy to demands for higher protection
and enforcement standards for intellectual property. It is therefore
important to determine if there is in fact a conflict between two opposing
human rights. Part IV focuses on States' human rights obligations and their
options for fulfilling such obligations.
PART I - Multinational Seed Companies vs. Farmers
1. The Impact of Genetic Engineering on Agriculture
In recent years genetically engineered, genetically modified, and
transgenic crops have had a significant impact on farming in North
America and the rest of the world. New breeds of crops, created for higher
yield, herbicide tolerance, or insect-resistance, promise higher productivity
for farmers.7 In the United States, most planted crops are already
genetically engineered.8
Most of these GE crops are created and marketed by a small number
of transnational corporations (TNCs) who have come to dominate seed
markets by buying up seed companies and smaller competing
biotechnology companies. 9  Today the ten leading seed companies
6. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) art. 2(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L M. 360, 361, available at
<www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a cescr.htm>.
7. Samantha M. Ohlgart, The Terminator Gene: Intellectual Property Rights vs. the
Farmers' Common Law Right to Save Seed, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 473 (2002).
8. The Center for Food Safety, Seizing Control: Monsanto's Path to Domination of
Biotech Crops and U.S. Agriculture, in MONSANTO V. U.S. FARMERS 8-9 (in 2004 85% of all
soy acreage, 45% of all corn acreage, and 76% of all cotton acreage was genetically
engineered).
9. Ellen Messer, Food Systems and Dietary Perspective: Are Genetically Modified
Organisms the Best Way to Ensure Nutritionally Adequate Food?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG.
STuD. 65, 65-66 (2001); Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between the
Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L.
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dominate 30% of the world seed market.' 0 These TNCs protect their
commercial interests by patenting the manipulated genetic strains and the
processes for their creation." In fact, it can even be said that these TNCs
had a major influence on the development of current domestic and
12international regimes for the protection of intellectual property.
2. Cases from the Developed World
In 1986, in the case Ex parte Hibberd, the U.S. Patent Office
recognized for the first time the possibility of granting utility patents on
plants. 13  Under the current patent legislation in the United States and
Canada, all plants and plant material-including seeds-containing
modified genetic traits can be patented. 14 These patents make it illegal to
make, use or sell the seeds or other parts of the plants without having first
acquired a license from the patent holder. The current legislation does not
differentiate between intentional and unintentional acts of infringement.
Therefore, not only farmers who plant GE seeds, but even those who are
completely unaware that some of the plants on their fields contain
manipulated DNA, become subject to legal liability. 5 Due to the nature of
the subject matter, the possibilities for this to happen are manifold.
Farmers who plant GE crop seeds on their fields only once take the
risk that remaining seeds might "volunteer," i.e., sprout, during the next
season. During harvest time the seeds of GE crops are also blown onto the
fields of neighboring farmers, where they might "volunteer." Finally, as
most of the crops in question reproduce sexually, i.e., through pollen,
modified DNA is transferred to other plants by cross-pollination. This
represents the biggest problem, as pollen can stay airborne for hours and be
carried by the wind for distances of several kilometers.' 6 This so-called
193, 204 n.36 (2002) (gives the example of Novartis, which resulted from the $63 billion
merger of the pharmaceutical corporations Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy and immediately became
the world's second largest seed firm).
10. Sell, supra note 9, at 204.
11. Ohlgart, supra note 7.
12. Drahos, supra note 1, at 260-46 (describes how the TRIPS Agreement came into
being as a result of lobbying efforts of American biotechnology corporations).
13. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 152 (2001).
14. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 8, at 11.
15. MARGARET MELLON & J. RISSLER, GONE TO THE SEED: TRANSGENIC
CONTAMINANTS IN THE TRADITIONAL SEED SUPPLY 45 (Union of Coordinated Scientists ed.,
2004).
16. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 14, at 39. INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE IN SOCIETY
& THIRD WORLD NETWORKS, THE CASE FOR A GM-FREE SUSTAINABLE WORLD 10 (Mae Wan
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"genetic drift" is considered unavoidable and cannot be stopped by
physical barriers.' 7 Farmers might therefore unwittingly find their fields or
their seed stock contaminated with modified DNA.
In fact, the contamination of seed material has become so pervasive
that experts consider it almost impossible to find commercial crop seeds in
North America that are guaranteed to be uncontaminated by manipulated
DNA. In one study it has been found that 50% of the tested corn and
soybean varieties, and 83% of the tested canola varieties were
contaminated with genetically modified DNA.'8
In the United States and Canada, Monsanto, the leading company in
agricultural bioengineering, 9 has recently started a campaign of
investigations and legal actions against farmers on whose fields plants with
modified DNA have been found, but who have not signed a licensing
agreement with Monsanto.2°
For example, in the case of Monsanto Canada v. Schmeiser,2' the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a farmer had infringed a patent under
the Canadian Patent Act even though he had admittedly never bought or
22used GE seed from Monsanto. Canola plants containing a patented gene
for herbicide resistance were found on the defendant's fields. These plants
were indistinguishable from other non-GE canola unless sprayed with one
of Monsanto's herbicides. It remained unclear how the GE seeds had
arrived on the defendant's fields, as the defendant only saved and
developed his own seeds. The defendant claimed they must have been
blown onto his fields thereby contaminating his own crops.
As a result of legal costs and court injunctions that permanently forbid
farmers to sell Monsanto's products, many farmers in the United States
have been driven out of business by Monsanto's lawsuits.23
Ho & Lim Li Ching eds., 2003), available at <www.indsp.org/A%20GM-
Free%20Sustainable%20World.pdf>.
17. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 8, at 37.
18. MELLON & RISSLER, supra note 15, at 26.
19. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 8, at 9 (Monsanto provides 90% of the
world's GE crops).
20. Id. at 31 (Monsanto has filed 90 lawsuits against 147 farmers in the United States
alone).
21. Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 1.
22. Id. at 3-4 (ARBouR J., dissenting) (Monsanto should not be allowed to extend its
patent claims for the modified DNA unto the plants themselves, as plants are considered
unpatentable under Canadian law. He would therefore have decided in favor of the
appellant).
23. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 8, at 21.
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3. The Impact on Developing Countries
In developing countries, small-hold subsistence farmers play a
significant role in domestic food production.24 The major agricultural
biotechnology companies are now aiming for these countries' seed
markets. They claim that GE crops could play a major role in combating
hunger and malnutrition by raising the productivity of small farmers and
developing crops that address the special needs of malnourished people,
such as vitamin-rich grains, known as "golden rice., 25  This claim is
heavily contested by experts who say that the cause of hunger is in most
cases not the overall lack of food, but the lack of accessibility. 26 In the case
of the 2005 famine in Niger, for example, the famine resulted from a spike
in food prices on the regional markets combined with a collapse of
purchasing power of Niger's pastoralists due to a drop in livestock prices.27
In fact, 80% of the people suffering from hunger live in food exporting
21countries. 8 One prime example is India, which has 320 million hungry
people despite the fact that over 60 million tons of food grains were
available in silos in 2001.29 In addition, the low productivity of these
farmers cannot be attributed to the lack of a "miracle crop," but to the
overall macro-economic situation and lack of market access, which prevent
higher productivity.
30
Small farmers usually have no financial means and consequently do
not buy seeds but instead rely on the cultivation of wild varieties and the
saving and swapping of seeds.31 Once they start cultivating GE crops
24. Peter Rossett, Genetically engineered crops - will they feed the hungry and reduce
poverty?, LEISA MAGAZINE, Dec. 2001, at 6. Timothy Byakola, The Fallacy of Genetic
Engineering And the Small Farmers in Africa, in VOICES FROM THE SOUTH - THE THIRD
WORLD DEBUNKS MYTHS ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 7-12 (Ellen Hickey &
Anuradha Mittal eds., 2003), available at
<www.foodfirst.org/pubs/other/voices/tocandintro.pdf>.
25. Messer, supra note 9, at 67.
26. Devinder Sharma, Biotechnology Will Bypass the Hungry, in VOICES FROM THE
SOUTH - THE THIRD WORLD DEBUNKS MYTHS ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 21-23
(Ellen Hickey & Anuradha Mittal eds., 2003), available at
<www.foodfirst.org/pubs/other/voices/tocandintro.pdf>.
27. Destitution not dearth, THE ECONOMIST, AUG. 20, 2005, at 53.
28. Food First, GMOs: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong Problem - Interview with
Rafael Mariano, Head of the Peasant Movement in the Philippines, in VOICES FROM THE
SOUTH - THE THIRD WORLD DEBUNKS MYTHS ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 6-7
(Ellen Hickey & Anuradha Mittal eds., 2003), available at
<www.foodfust.org/pubs/other/voices/tocandintro.pdf>.
29. Sharma, supra note 26, at 23.
30. Rossett, supra note 24, at 7. Byakola, supra 24.
31. Byakola, supra note 24.
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however, the license agreements they will have to sign under new IP
regimes would put them under an obligation to buy new seeds every
season.
At the same time, in order to protect their patents, transnational
corporations exert political influence to open up developing countries for
their GE products and guarantee a level of intellectual property protection
similar to the level of protection they enjoy in the United States and other
developed countries.
It can be expected that in developing countries, where the wild
ancestors of crop plants can still be found, manipulated DNA from GE
varieties will contaminate other crop varieties, especially "landraces. 32
The term "landraces" is used to describe plants that are selected by
traditional farmers from wild populations.33 Due to illiteracy and the lack
of information, small farmers in developing countries will be unable to take
precautions against the contamination of these other varieties.34 In 2001 it
was discovered that landraces of maize in Mexico had already been
contaminated by transgenic DNA from GE maize varieties from the United
States even though a national moratorium against GE crops had been in
place since 1998.
35
The governments of developing countries find themselves under
pressure from the United States and other developed countries to join
international (TRIPS) and bilateral (TRIPS plus) agreements on the
protection of intellectual property. These agreements would obligate them
to modify their domestic IP laws and to protect foreign intellectual property
according to Western standards. As a result, traditional small-hold farmers
in developing countries might soon find themselves in a situation similar to
that currently faced by farmers in North America.
PART II - The Right to Food
When farmers in developing countries have to give up growing food
crops this does not only affect their own subsistence but also the local
availability of food in general. The human right most affected by the new
developments in agrotechnology and intellectual property legislation is,
32. Stephen B. Brush, Genetically Modified Organisms in Peasant Farming: Social
Impact and Equity, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135, 140 (2001). Rossett, supra note 24,
at 8.
33. MELLON & RISSLER, supra note 15, at 46.
34. Brush, supra note 32.
35. MELLON & RISSLER, supra note 15, at 47. INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE IN SOCIETY & THIRD
WORLD NETWORKS, supra note 16, at 9.
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therefore, the right to adequate food.
1. The Content of the Right to Adequate Food
The right to adequate food was first recognized as a human right in
Article 26(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) 36 and is most comprehensively dealt with in Article 11 of the 1966
CESCR. 37 "Adequate" means that the right goes beyond a mere claim to a
minimum intake of calories.38 Rather the food has to be culturally
acceptable, appropriate to physiological needs according to age, gender,
and occupation, and free from adverse substances.39
To fulfill the right, adequate food must be both available and
accessible to everybody in sufficient quality and quantity. Availability
requires that food is either produced locally on farmable land or is
transported from the site of production to the places of demand. 40 As
worldwide food production is already high enough to feed every inhabitant
of the earth, the true problem is not insufficient production but unequal
distribution.41 Therefore, measures to make existing food available to the
hungry have priority over those aimed at increasing food production.
Where food is available, it must also be economically and physically
accessible for those who are in need. Economic accessibility requires that a
suitable diet be affordable for everyone. Food pricing, appropriate
minimum wages and state subsidies are all factors involved to allow for a
life of dignity. Physical accessibility requires that the physically
disadvantaged, such as the elderly, the disabled, children, and people in
disaster-prone areas have access to adequate food, too.
42
Measures to implement the access to food must focus on
sustainability. The supply and access to food should be guaranteed even in
crisis situations, both for the present as well as for future generations. This
is best achieved by measures that help people return to self-reliance rather
36. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/217
(Dec. 10, 1948).
37. CESCR, supra note 6, art. 11. See also UN COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS, GENERAL COMMENTS 12 - THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1999/5 (1999).
38. UN COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 37, 6.
39. Asbjom Eide, The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to
Food, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS - A TEXTBOOK 90 (Asbjom Eide,
Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas eds., 1995).
40. UN COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 37, 12.
41. Messer, supra note 9, at 68.
42. UN COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 37, 13.
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than depend on outside aid.
Sustainability has different aspects. Environmental sustainability, for
example, requires a judicious use of natural resources to guarantee the
stability of food supply for the future.43 Economic and social sustainability
are meant to guarantee food supply in times of recession or other economic
crises through effective markets and public policies." Opponents of
agricultural gene-engineering have argued that GE crops threaten the
sustainability of food access in various ways. One main criticism is that
such crops undermine farmers' self-reliance by making them dependent on
the TNCs that market GE crops.
2. The Right to Self-Determination
The problems associated with patents on gene-modified crop plants do
not only affect the right to adequate food as embodied in Article 11.2
CESCR but also the right to self-determination (Articles 1.2 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and 1.2 CESCR). Article
1.2, which is common to both Covenants, provides that "[i]n no case may a
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." Under the
circumstances described above, this sub-norm obviously might be affected
when transnational biotechnology and seed corporations use legal and
economic means to either bring farmers into total economic dependency or
to drive them out of business.
The right to self-determination is, however, formulated as a people's
right and cannot be invoked by individuals.45 It would only be violated in a
situation where a country's resources for food production are either
exploited in the exclusive interest of, or transferred without compensation
to, foreign corporations or a small part of the population.46 This might not
be a problem in developed countries like the United States or Canada,
where food production resources are still used to ensure the food supply for
the general population. It will, however, definitely be an issue in
developing countries where the control over resources for food production
is reassigned from local farmers to foreign-mostly U.S.-based-
corporations or their local subsidiaries. When these resources no longer
contribute to the local food supply but are instead exploited for the more
43. Eide, supra note 39, at 90.
44. Id.
45. MANFRED NOVAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS - CCPR
COMMENTARY 14-15 (1993).
46. Amartya Sen, The Right Not to be Hungry, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 23 (P. Alston &
K. Tomagek eds., 1984). Novak, supra note 45, at 25.
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profitable production of cash crops, there is a clear violation of the right
defined in Articles 1.2 ICCPR and 1.2 CESCR.
In such a case, a developing State may have the right to unilaterally
rescind its obligations under international economic treaties that lead to
such violations, without having to pay compensation to affected
foreigners.47 Due to the existing international political and economic
dependencies, however, rescinding obligations will only be a theoretical
option for most developing states.
3. Why Do GE Crops Undermine Food Security?
While the TNCs involved in the development and marketing of GE
crops claim that their products might contribute to eradicating hunger in the
world, it is obvious that they are not motivated by pure philanthropy but by
their desire to generate profits. These profits can only be generated through
enlarging their market shares and selling their seeds to more and more
farmers. The problem the TNCs are facing, however, is that seeds are, by
their very nature, a self-replicating product. Under normal circumstances, a
farmer would have to buy seed only once. After that first purchase he
could simply save some seed from his first harvest, as farmers have done
for millennia. In order to guarantee a steady inflow of revenue, the TNCs
would have to find ways to make farmers break with the practice of seed-
saving and instead buy new seed every season.
Attempts to safeguard their interests through means of gene-
engineering failed. The so-called "terminator" gene that caused plants
grown from GE seed to express only sterile seeds had to be withdrawn
from the market due to political and public resistance.48 The industry thus
had to fall back on legal measures.
Farmers who want to buy GE seeds are required to sign license
agreements with the TNCs. Under these agreements, it is expressly
forbidden to save seeds from the harvest in order to sow or swap them with
other farmers. As the patented genetic traits tend to spread out onto other
plant varieties, additional legal measures are taken to prevent these traits
47. See Novak, supra note 45, at 24-25.
48. Davis Weissbrodt & Kell Schoff, Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property
Protection: The Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7, 5 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 24-25 (2003). Besides the obvious economic effects of this new
technology on farmers, who would be forced to buy new seeds every season, and on food
production, part of the resistance stemmed from the concern that "Terminator" plants might
also cause sterility in other crops on neighboring fields through genetic drift. See
JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 162 (2001).
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from falling into the public domain. Lawsuits are brought against farmers
who continue to use their seed material after the plants have acquired a
patented gene through contamination.
Small and peasant farmers in developing countries are not ideal
customers of GE crops. Whereas large farms in developing countries
cultivate "cash crops" that are meant for export, small farmers typically
grow only staple food crops that are meant for their own consumption.
Very little of their harvest is sold on local markets in exchange for cash.
The money earned is mostly used for household needs.49  These small
farmers therefore operate with very little or no financial resources and
cannot afford to buy seeds from seed companies. Instead, they save seed
from their harvest, swap it with other farmers, or cultivate landraces.
These small-hold farmers are very important for sustainable access to
food in these countries as they are usually the primary producers of staple
food. 50 Their production contributes to the local availability of food and
helps shield the population from price spikes on regional and world
markets. In many developing countries, the small-hold farming sector is,
for a majority of the population, also the only possibility of earning a
livelihood.51  Small-hold farmers are usually self-reliant in their food
production, and play important roles in the local food supply. Through the
cultivation of landraces and seed exchange with other farmers, they create
new varieties that are especially adjusted to the climatic conditions of the
particular region.52 The cultivation of such indigenous varieties is a further
safeguard for food security. The use of GE seed would compromise all of
these important functions.
The cultivation of patented GE crops is, in many aspects, the antithesis
of sustainable and self-reliant food production. Farmers who cultivate GE
crops become dependent on seed companies for their constant need to
purchase seed. In order to afford this, small farmers have to radically
change their farming practices. Instead of growing staple food for private
and local consumption, they have to cultivate "cash crops" that can be sold
49. Byakola, supra note 24, at 8.
50. Rossett, supra note 24, at 6. Susan K. Sell, Wat Role for Humanitarian Intellectual
Property Rights? - The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 6 MINN. J. L. Scl. &
TECH. 191, 202 (2004).
51. Sell, supra note 50.
52. Vandana Shiva gives the examples of Indian coastal farmers having evolved
salt-resistant varieties, Himalayan farmers having evolved frost-resistant varieties,
etc. Vandana Shiva, The Indian Seed Act and Patent Act: Sowing the Seeds of
Dictatorship, ZNET (February 14, 2005), at
<www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionlD=56&ItemlD=7249>.
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for export in order to generate the money necessary to buy more seed. This
practice limits local food supplies. During the so-called "Green
Revolution" in the 1970s, 53 the introduction of improved crops and their
mono-cropped production had resulted in a shortage of other traditional
staple food in several developing countries.54 A change from the
cultivation of local food crop varieties to the production of "cash crops"
also typically leads to an impoverishment of the farmers' own diet as they
cannot afford to buy the same amount and variety of staple food and relish
crops that they previously used to grow for themselves.55
Fanning of GE crops makes the stability of food supply highly
susceptible to natural disasters, price fluctuations, and other outside
influences. Subsistence farmers have no savings or other financial
resources to fall back on in the event of a bad harvest. Very often they do
not even own the land they farm.56 If a fanner loses his income due to a
bad harvest, a drop in prices on the world market, or some other cause, he
cannot afford to buy new seed for the next season. As he is not allowed to
save seeds, he may have to give up farming.
As noted above, farmers who do not grow GE crops themselves are
still affected when their neighbors grow such crops. In developing
countries, farmers are highly dependent on saving seeds or on cultivating
wild varieties. When transgenic contamination of seed stock and wild
varieties occurs, as has already happened, it might become impossible for
farmers to find seed that they can still use without infringing intellectual
property rights. Small and peasant farmers in developing countries are in
even less of a position to pay license fees or legal expenses in defense of
their rights than their counterparts in developed countries. As a result, they
could be forced to abandon farming which would further limit the local
53. Stephen Brush argues that the example of the "Green Revolution" can serve as a
model to project the social impact of the introduction of GE crops:
In both cases, the technology at hand is generated by scientists rather than farmers,
by "high technology" and capital intensive institutions, and with international
transfers of genetic resources. The results of both are touted as offering benefits for
poor and developing countries. Perhaps the most critical difference is that the
Green Revolution crops were produced by public agencies and without intellectual
property, while many GMO crops are produced by private companies using
intellectual property.
Brush, supra note 32, at 146.
54. Two examples are Brazil and India. See Messer, supra note 9. Another is Zambia.
See Bernadette Lubozhya, Genetically Engineered Crops Threaten Food Security in
Zambia, in VOICES FROM THE SOUTH - THE THIRD WORLD DEBUNKS MYTHS ON
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 17 (Ellen Hickey & Anuradha Mittal eds., 2003).
55. Lubozhya, supra note 54.
56. Food First, supra note 28, at 7.
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availability of food.
4. Parallels to Pharmaceutical IPRs
A parallel can be drawn between the potential effects patents on GE
crop plants may have on the right to food and the effects intellectual
property rights (IPRs) on pharmaceutical products have already had on the
right to health. IPRs, such as patents, convey a form of monopoly that is
used by transnational corporations to carve up the global market and keep
prices for products high.
One prime example given by Peter Drahos is India in the 1950s,
before it had developed its own pharmaceutical industry.57 At that time,
India was dependent on the import of pharmaceuticals; and while it had one
of the poorest populations in the world, it had the highest drug prices.
Similarly, the prices for AIDS medication were higher in South Africa,
where they were much-needed, than in European countries, as
pharmaceutical companies preferred to sell their products to the small, rich
upper-class, rather than to the large number of poor people most affected
by the epidemic. This changed only after South Africa introduced
controversial legislation that allowed compulsory licensing of AIDS drugs.
In addition, transnational pharmaceutical corporations divert their
research efforts from important pharmaceuticals such as new antibiotics or
medication against tropical diseases, to the development of drugs against
"lifestyle afflictions" such as obesity-caused diabetes or old-age erectile
dysfunction. 58 Again, the pharmaceutical industry's focus rests solely on
upper-class markets in developed countries.
Similar developments will take place in the wake of crop-plant IPRs.
The patent monopolies will allow seed companies to keep seed prices high,
ensuring high profit margins. This will cause food prices to rise, making
food economically unavailable to the poor. High food prices and economic
unavailability are, in fact, already among the main causes of hunger in the
world. In India and Bangladesh, a large part of the population suffers from
hunger, while at the same time large amounts of grain are rotting away in
storage every year, because the poor cannot afford to buy the grain. 59 This
57. Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, The World Trade Organization 's Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in Context, 20 WiS. INT'L
L.J. 451, 466-68 (2002).
58. Sell, supra note 50, at 200.
59. Sharma, supra note 26, at 22. Anuradha Mittal, Technology Won't Feed World's
Hungry, in VOICES FROM THE SOUTH - THE THIRD WORLD DEBUNKS MYTHS ON
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 24 (Ellen Hickey & Anuradha Mittal eds., 2003),
available at <www.foodfirst.org/pubs/other/voices/tocandintro.pdf>.
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situation presents a clear violation of their right to adequate food.6 °
Apart from certain publicity stunts, such as the "golden rice" that was
supposed to combat Vitamin A deficiencies among malnourished
children, 61 seed corporations concentrate their research on high-profit cash
crops for exportation,62 such as cotton, or crops that are fed to livestock.63
These crops do not contribute to the local food supply but rather draw away
land and other resources that would otherwise be available for local food
production.
It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that patented GE crops will make
food less available to poor people in the same way that drug patents have
already kept much-needed medications away from them.
PART III - A Conflicting Human Right to IP?
The issue at hand is only one example of how expansive claims to
intellectual property rights conflict with the economic interests, and
ultimately with the socio-economic rights, of other groups and individuals.
Transnational corporations, the main proponents of expansive IP
enforcement,64 already have the economic power on their side. But to add
moral weight to their arguments, they seek recourse to a human right to
IPRs that could cancel out conflicting socio-economic rights.
1. The Argument for a Human Right to IP
If the owners of patents on GE crops themselves had recourse to a
human right to IP, States would equally be under an obligation to promote
and protect it. Some scholars argue that the right to intellectual property
has the status of a human right, even though it is hardly ever recognized as
60. See CESCR, supra note 6, art. 11. See also UN COMMISSION ON SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 37, 14 (economic and physical accessibility).
61. See Food First, Grains of Hope, in VOICES FROM THE SOUTH - THE THIRD WORLD
DEBUNKS MYTHS ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 35 (Ellen Hickey & Anuradha Mittal
eds., 2003), available at <www.foodfirst.org/pubs/other/voices/tocandintro.pdf>.
62. Sell, supra note 50, at 200.
63. According to Liane Schalatek, 90% of all GE crops harvested in 1998 were
soybeans and maize, which were "primarily used to feed livestock, not people." Liane
Schalatek, The WTO, Genetically Modified Crops, and the Issues of Food Safety and Food
Security - An Introduction, in WORLD TRADE, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE - A LOOK AT THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS AND THE ISSUE OF FOOD
SECURITY 3 (Liane Schalatek ed., 2001), available at <www.boell.org/docs/WTO-Food-
GMO.pdf>.
64. Peter Drahos traces the current IP agenda of the WTO and developed countries back
to the efforts of a small number of transnational corporations. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM - WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002).
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one.6
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Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
speaks of the "right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is
the author." This right is repeated in Article 15(1) CESCR. This could be
understood as a right to the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights.
2. No Human Right to Patents
Critics of the current international intellectual property regime argue,
however, that while there is a human right to own works of innovation or
authorship, this does not imply that all intellectual property rights
automatically have the status of a human right. It also does not mean that
there is a duty for States to protect patents in their present form.66 The
moral and material interests of an author under Article 15 (1) CESCR do
not necessarily coincide with the scope and extent of intellectual property
rights conferred under national legislation and international treaties.67
Human rights are, by their very nature, unalienable, whereas most
intellectual property rights are temporary and can be transferred to
someone else,68 with the exception of the moral right to be identified as the
author of a work. But some intellectual property rights, like patents, seem
especially incompatible with the basic concepts of human rights. For this
reason intellectual property should not be viewed as one single right, but
each specific right should be inspected individually.
69
In the United States, GE crops are usually protected under utility
patents. Utility patents, unlike other forms of intellectual property rights,
allow for the protection of plant parts and of modified genetic traits across
different plant varieties. Until the U.S. Congress deleted the farmers'
65. Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty. New
Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the
Conversation ofBiodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1998).
66. CURTIS COOK, PATENTS, PROFIT & POWER - How INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RULES
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 140-143 (2002).
67. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS; STATEMENT
BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 6, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2001/15 (2001).
68. Id.
69. Ori Fischman Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural
Law Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 497 n. 128 (2004).
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privilege from the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1994, making it
expressly illegal to save seeds, utility patent law used to have the additional
advantage over laws covering plant varieties that it did not recognize a
farmer's right to save seed. 70  However, patent rights are, as mentioned
before, especially poor candidates for human rights status.
First of all, the exclusiveness of a patent contradicts the universal
nature of human rights. Proponents of a human right to intellectual
property argue that its justification lies in the recognition of the value of the
human person through the protection of the product of his or her creative
endeavors. 7 1
A patent gives its owner the right to exclude everybody else from
making, using, or selling the patented invention.72 This right is given
exclusively either, as in the United States, to the individual who was first in
making the invention, or, as in the United Kingdom and other European
countries, to the first person to file the application for the patent.73 The
patent also applies to similar inventions that accomplish a similar result.
74
This is called the "doctrine of equivalents. '' 75 For example, a patent for a
genetically modified genetic strain that provides for resistance against a
certain herbicide might apply to all plants that are resistant to this
herbicide, regardless of the genetic modification method used to achieve
this result.76
Thus, even if a second individual achieves a similar result out of his
own labor and inventiveness, the existing patent bars him from profiting
70. Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between the Commercial
and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 193, 203
(2002).
71. Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of
Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 315, 347 (2003).
72. DONALD A. GREGORY, CHARLES W. SABER & JON D. GROSSMANN, INTRODUCTION
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 8 (1994).
73. LIONEL BENTLEY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 346 (2001).
74. Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: Human Rights to
Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW AND POLICY 315, 322 (1996).
75. COOK, supra note 66, at 140.
76. Stefan Flothmann and Juergen Knirsch cite the example of the patent on a new
variety of maize granted to DuPont. The patent was formulated so broadly that it covered
"all maize varieties that exceed a certain level of oil and fatty acids." However, there were
already maize varieties in existence prior to the granting of the patent that fulfilled these
criteria. Stefan Flothmann & Juergen Knirsch, People over Profit: WTO and GMOs in the
Context of Food Security, Food Safety and Sovereignty, in WORLD TRADE, FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE - A LOOK AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS AND THE ISSUE OF FOOD SECURITY, supra note 63, at 67.
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from his work.77 A truly universal human right, on the other hand, would
protect every production as the product of a human person's creative
endeavor, regardless of its novelty.78 It does not so much recognize the
inventor's claim to material profit, but the intrinsic worth of individual
human effort.
However, it is exactly their exclusiveness and their broad protection
that make patents more attractive to biotechnology companies than other
less extensive forms of intellectual property protection, such as plant
breeder's rights. Patents are not only used to protect the inventor's
economic interests in the invention, instead, biotechnology companies try
to weave impregnable webs of defensive patents on entire species,
economic characteristics, reproductive behavior or basic techniques of
biotechnology 79 that are designed to bar competitors from the widest
possible field of research. 80  These defensive patents not only affect
commercial competitors but might also bar a State from conducting public
research for the benefit of its citizens, thus conflicting with the State's
ability to fulfill its duties and obligations towards it citizens.
In addition, the exclusiveness of a patent right allows the owner to bar
others from resources necessary for life and health.81 The recourse to a
human right would therefore be used to limit another human right.82 It is
this possibility of harm to other people that makes it especially hard to
accept patents as a human right.
3. Limits of a Human Right to IP
Even if one were to accept the existence of a human right to patents
under Article 27(2) UDHR and Article 15(1) ICESCR, the interdependence
and indivisibility of human rights still demand that the right be interpreted
in a way that does not conflict with other human rights and be consistent
with the concept of human dignity.83 Balancing intellectual property rights
with human rights interests such as the right to food, water or health does
not necessarily favor the patent holder.
84
77. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 72, at 8.
78. Gana, supra note 74, at 323.
79. Sell, supra note 70, at 204.
80. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 64, at 52-55.
81. Afori, supra note 69, at 523.
82. Gana, supra note 70, at 351.
83. See Coombe, supra note 65, at 88. Winston P. Nagan, International Intellectual
Property, Access to Health Care, and Human Rights: South Africa v. United States, 14 FLA.
J. INT'L L. 155, 188 (2002).
84. See Afori, supra note 69, at 502.
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Article 27(1) UDHR addresses everybody's right to participate in
cultural life, enjoyment of the arts, and share in scientific advancement and
its benefits. The Article is very broadly framed and does not give express
provisions on how the rights of the author and the rights of everybody else
have to be balanced.85 However, the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress expressed in paragraph (1) of Article 27 can be interpreted as
placing a limit on the level of protection for IP rights. An intellectual
property regime that hinders States from fulfilling their core obligations in
regard to health, food and education conflicts with State parties' legally
binding human rights obligations.86 This interpretation of Article 27 is
reaffirmed in Resolution 2000/7 of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Human
Rights,87 which expresses concern about the negative impact of intellectual
property protection regimes on the realization of human rights.88
PART IV - States between a Rock and a Hard Place
Under these circumstances, the obligation is on States to undertake
legislative efforts in order to limit the negative effects of intellectual
property rights on the right to adequate food. They are, however, limited
by other conflicting international obligations, and often find themselves
pressured into foregoing human rights concerns in favor of stronger IPR
enforcement.
1. The Obligation to Respect, Protect and Fulfill the Right to Adequate
Food
Under Article 2 CESCR, a State has the duty to undertake measures
"to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized," including its
citizens' right to food. The fact that the realization of the rights is only to
be achieved "progressively" does not absolve State parties from taking
immediate effective measures towards their realization. 89 It imposes, on
States, the obligation to respect, protect and fulfill.90 With respect to the
85. Weissbrodt & Schoff, supra note 48, at 3.
86. See Weissbrodt & Schoff, supra note 48, at 4.
87. Sub-Commission on Human Rights Res. 200/7, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2000/7 (2000).
88. Weissbrodt & Schoff, supra note 48, at 25.
89. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 67, 11.
90. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS:
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right to food, one of the obligations flowing from this undertaking is the
obligation to protect existing entitlements and resource bases91 against
more powerful economic interests.92 When small farmers in developing
countries, who produce their own food, have to give up farming after losing
their productive resources, they often have no other viable means of
earning their livelihood. 93
States violate an economic right if they adopt legislation that is
incompatible with the right or even reduces the extent to which the right is
guaranteed. 94 States also violate an economic right if they fail to regulate
activities of individuals or groups in order to prevent them from violating
the right. 95 It can therefore be said that a State is in clear violation of the
right to food when it enacts legislation that limits existing entitlements for
the benefit of third parties, and allows third parties to take away resource
bases. A State also violates the right if it fails to enact additional
legislation in cases where the existing system of ownership and exchange
interferes with the access to food and resources of food production.
96
Access to seed, land, and markets are, to farmers, the resource bases
for the production of food. At least in developing countries the farmers'
right to save and swap seeds and sell their own harvest is the basis of food
security and therefore is directly linked to the right to adequate food. With
regard to the issue of gene-modified seeds, this Article may put States
under an obligation to protect an existing right to save seed or a farmer's
right to use his own seed and sell his own harvest even after the occurrence
of contamination with patented genetic strains.
2. Conflicting Obligations under the CESCR and TRIPS
On the other hand, a government might have the international
obligation under TRIPS or under a bilateral investment treaty to amend its
MAASTRICHT GUIDELINES ON VIOLATIONS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, §
11 (6), U.N. Doc. 12/2000/13 (2000).
91. Eide, supra note 39, at 102-103.
92. Eide, supra note 39, at 37.
93. Michael Windfuhr, Impact of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture on the Right to
Adequate Food, in WORLD TRADE, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE - A LOOK AT THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS AND THE ISSUE OF FOOD
SECURITY 24 (The Heinrich B611 Foundation ed., 2001), available at
<www.boell.org/docs/WTO-Food-GMO.pdf>.
94. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 90, §§ II (14)(c) and (14)(e).
95. Id. § II (15)(d).
96. See MATrHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT, 314 (1995).
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legislation in order to protect the intellectual property rights on gene-
modified genetic plants. In the case of gene-modified seeds, the interests
protected under the two treaties are directly opposed, creating diverging
obligations.
Both the CESCR and TRIPS are international treaties, which are
binding on member states. According to Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a State must fulfill its obligations under
a treaty. The State cannot unilaterally refuse to honor its obligations under
one treaty, just because they conflict with its obligations under a later one.
If there is a conflict between the obligations of two treaties, the Vienna
Convention demands for an interpretation that gives effect to both.97 Even
though there should be a primacy of human rights norms over economic
policies and agreements,98 governments might be compelled to fulfill the
obligations under TRIPS, as TRIPS has strong enforcement mechanisms,
whereas the CESCR does not.
The international monitoring mechanisms for socio-economic human
rights are relatively weak, and their recommendations and decisions are not
legally binding.99 Due to the nature of the social and economic rights
defined in the CESCR, many authors believe that these rights are not
justiciable rights but just aspirational statements.100 The TRIPS agreement,
on the other hand, provides for an effective dispute settlement mechanism
and allows for trade sanctions and other retaliatory measures against non-
complying states.10 l
3. Options for Developing Countries
Although TRIPS significantly diminishes a State's sovereignty in
regard to intellectual property policies, certain options remain. Under
Article 27 TRIPS, States can exclude plants from patentability'0° as long as
they provide an effective sui generis system for the protection of plant
97. Weissbrodt & Schoff, supra note 48, at 13.
98. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Human Rights
Res. 2000/7, Intellectual property rights and human rights, ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd
Sess., 25th mtg. 7, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2000/7 (2000).
99. Weissbrodt & Schoff, supra note 48, at 12.
100. Martin Scheinin, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights, in ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 41-42 (Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause &
Allan Rosas eds., 1995).
101. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRrES 2 (2000).
102. Id. at 186.
Farmers in the IP Wrench
varieties. 0 3 There are no provisions outlining the possible scope and extent
of such a sui generis mechanism in the TRIPS agreement, as this was left to
be dealt with in a separate document.
10 4
Given the problems that patents on plant varieties pose for farming
and food security, developing countries would be well advised to make use
of Article 27.'05 Plant breeder's rights under such a protection mechanism
can differ from patents in their scope. The legislation of a sui generis
regime can also provide that plant breeders' rights shall not accumulate
with other intellectual property rights, such as patents. 0 6 The creation of
such a protection mechanism can, therefore, be one way for governments to
reconcile their international obligations under TRIPS with their human
rights obligations.
One possible sui generis mechanism is the "Union Intemationale pour
la Protection des Obtentions Vegetales" (Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, or UPOV) Convention that provides uniform provisions
on the extent of plant breeder's rights. Member countries of the WTO may
follow these provisions. They are, however, not obliged to do so.'
0 7
UPOV was last revised in 1991, and in its latest form reflects the
American standard of protection of IPR on plants insofar as it limits
researchers' exemptions and the farmers' right to save seeds, and
completely disallows the exchange or sale of seed.'08 As the 1991 UPOV
Convention offers few advantages for developing countries, very few have
become members. 109
4. Developing Countries under Pressure
Although the protection of plant breeders' rights through the UPOV
Convention clearly goes beyond the requirements of TRIPS, the United
States is trying to market UPOV as the only permissible sui generis
mechanism under Article 27(3) TRIPS. The United States' efforts to
include UPOV provisions in bilateral Free Trade Agreements can be seen
103. Sell, supra note 79, at 203.
104. Correa, supra note 101, at 231.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 69.
107. Id. at 231.
108. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 141 (2001).
109. Jayarashree Watal, Perspectives from National Systems and Universities: India, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICULTURE: THE WORLD BANK'S ROLE IN ASSISTING
BORROWER AND MEMBER COUNTRIES 53 (Uma Lele, William Lesser & Gesa Horstkotte-
Wesseler eds., 2000).
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as the creation of "TRIPS plus," which aims at increasing the standard of
protection for IPR even further. The negotiations are taking place with the
threat of using trade enforcement tools under the U.S. Trade Act as a
backdrop. 110
Despite the fact that the TRIPS agreement grants an automatic
transitional period for developing countries to amend their IP laws,
developing countries find themselves under pressure by developed
countries to immediately enact domestic IP laws that are up to TRIPS
standards or surpass them."' When these countries succumb to the
pressure, it will be at the expense of food security and consequently, their
citizens' right to food.
A bilateral IP agreement between Ecuador and the United States,
which provided for protection of plant varieties through patents or a system
comparable to UPOV, failed to be ratified only after massive protests. An
Ecuadorian NGO had discovered that an American citizen had already
obtained a patent on an indigenous plant that was used as an ingredient in a
sacred Amazonian hallucinogenic drink."12
5. The Case of India
The development of IPR legislation in India serves as another example
of how a developing country can be pressured into accepting IP protection
standards that conflict with its citizens' right to food.
The original 1970 Patent Act did not recognize patents on life forms
or methods of agriculture.1 13 When India, after initial resistance, agreed to
TRIPS,' 14 it undertook an international obligation to amend some of its IP
laws.
However, India is especially vulnerable to the negative impact that
strong IP regulations on GE crops might have, as the majority of its
population is dependent on small farms for its subsistence.1 15 In addition,
80% of all seed used in India is still saved by farmers. 1 6 It was against this
background that the public debate on the draft legislation took place. India
110. Drahos, supra note 1, at 265.
111. CORREA, supra note 101, at 109.
112. Sell, supra note 79, at 205.
113. Shiva, supra note 52.
114. India was initially opposed to the TRIPS Agreement. Its resistance was only broken
through unilateral U.S. trade sanctions. See WATAL, supra note 108, at 24.
115. S.K. Verma, Plant Genetic Resources, Biological Inventions and Intellectual
Property Rights: The Case of India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL
RESOURCES 146 (Burton Ong ed., 2004).
116. Shiva, supra note 52.
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finally enacted three inter-related laws: the Plant Variety Protection and
Farmers' Rights Act (2001), the Patent (Amendment) Act (2002), and the
Biological Diversity Act (2002). 117
These laws made use of the legislative freedom that remained to India
under TRIPS. The first Patent (Amendment) Act made use of the option in
Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS agreement to exclude plants from
patentability. Instead, the Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights
Act provided a mechanism for the protection of plant varieties, which
aimed at balancing breeders' and farmers' rights and protecting farmers'
self-reliance." 8  While this Act was primarily based on the UPOV
Convention, it included several provisions that reflected the specific
situation in India." 19 It recognized the traditional rights of farmers to save
and swap seed, and to share or sell their harvest. 120 The Plant Variety Act
further provided that the registration of a variety can be denied to protect
human life and health.
While this legislation aimed at limiting the excesses of IP protection
of GE crops and safeguarding the food security of India's peasant farmers,
India faced pressure from the World Trade Organization and the United
States to further amend its IP laws. The United States had already brought
a complaint against India under the WTO dispute settlement system in
1996, and India was held to be in violation of some of its TRIPS
obligations, 121 by inter alia not allowing patents on agricultural chemical
products. 
122
Under the second amendment to the Patent Act, processes for the
treatments of plants became subjects for patents. The amendment also
added a provision that expressly allows the production or propagation of
GE plants to be considered an invention.123 Thus, it opened the door for the
recognition of utility patents on GE plants. Finally, in 2004 a third
amendment and a new Seed Act have been enacted. The amendment,
which was passed by the Indian parliament on March 23, 2005, allows for
the parallel protection of GE crops through both utility patents and plant
breeders' rights. 124 This goes beyond India's obligations under the TRIPS
117. Verma, supra note 115, at 147.
118. Swati Gola, The Patent Bill 2005: Impact on Agriculture, IMC INDIA (Mar. 22,
2005), available at <india.indymedia.org/en/2005/03/210277.shtml>.
119. Verma, supra note 115, at 148.
120. Id. at 149.
121. CORREA, supra note 101, at 109.
122. WATAL, supra note 108, at 74.
123. Shiva, supra note 113.
124. Gola, supra note 118.
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Agreement. The stated objective of the Seed Act, on the other hand, is to
replace saved seeds with seeds from the private seed industry. 125  To
achieve this aim, the swapping ("bartering") of seeds between farmers is
made a criminal act that can be punished with a fine of up to 25,000 Rs.
Together, these two laws create legal IP protection for gene-modified
plants comparable to that of the United States.1
26
PART V - Duties of Third States
As developing countries find themselves under political and economic
pressure from highly developed countries to amend their intellectual
property legislation in order to accommodate the interests of transnational
corporations, a question arises-specifically, what obligations the right to
food places on third States.
Article 1 1 CESCR deals mostly with the duties of the home State.
The obligations on third States are rather weak, as the Article speaks only
of "international cooperation based on free consent." During the traveaux
prmparatoires, developed states opposed a stronger wording that might
have given developing states a direct claim for foreign aid. 127 Nevertheless,
the rights in Article 11 CESCR cannot be interpreted to free third States
from all duties. When read in conjunction with Article 5.1 CESCR, it is
clear that the right to food imposes a minimum obligation on other States to
refrain from any action aimed at the destruction of the right.
As previously noted, the greatest threat posed by overly strong
intellectual property rights on GE crops is the deprivation of farmers,
through legal channels, of their means of production. This has already
occurred in the United States and Canada. This might also affect the right
to economic self-determination as covered in Articles 1.2 ICCPR and 1.2
CESCR. This right, the only one covered in both covenants, states "[i]n no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.' 12' This
could include a direct prohibition of measures and policies that exploit
food-production resources exclusively for the interest of foreign
corporations while parts of the population starve or are malnourished.
The right to self-determination has the additional advantage that is
125. Shiva, supra note 113.
126. Id. Shiva asks, with reference, to the Canadian Monsanto Canada Inc. v Schmeiser
cases (supra note 21), whether Indian farmers will be blamed for theft, too, "when
Monsanto's GM cotton contaminates their crops."
127. CRAVEN, supra note 96, at 148-49 and 296-97. See also P. ALSTON & K.
TOMAgEVSKI, THE RIGHT TO FOOD 40-41 (1984).
128. P. ALSTON & K. TOMAgEVSKI, THE RIGHT TO FOOD 23 (1984).
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also included in the ICCPR. When we speak about the most-developed
countries in this context, we are mostly speaking about the United States of
America. While the European Union, Canada, and Japan also support the
movement for stronger international intellectual property protection, the
United States is the most arduous supporter of genetically engineered
agricultural products, is the home of the largest number of transnational
corporations, and is the most willing to use political and economic coercion
against developing countries. 
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The United States, however, never acceded to the CESCR, and is
therefore not bound by its provisions. It did however accede to the ICCPR.
An obligation that is covered by the ICCPR would thus be more useful in
terms of Realpolitik than one that is only covered by the CESCR.
The absolute minimum duty that both the right to adequate food and
the right to self-determination impose on third States is the duty to avoid
international policies and practices that deprive other States of their means
of subsistence. 130 This means that States have to avoid policies that force
other States to adopt intellectual property regimes that result in farmers
being either deprived of their means of production or forced into permanent
economic dependence on foreign corporations. In light of this duty,
provisions of international and bilateral treaties on intellectual property
protection might violate the rights to self-determination and adequate food.
At least, however, a policy to force other countries to adopt a certain
interpretation of such provisions, which runs contrary to the rights to self-
determination and adequate food, is a clear violation of this duty not to
deprive.
In addition to avoid depriving policies themselves, States also have a
duty to protect peoples in other States from being deprived of their means
of subsistence through domestically-based entities such as transnational
corporations.131  This includes policies and legislation to regulate their
activities. Unfortunately, the current intellectual property policies of the
most-developed countries in general, and the United States in particular,
ignore these duties and the concerns of developing countries, as they only
aim at furthering the interests of the pharmaceutical and biotechnological
129. Peter Drahos describes how the United States used bilateral trade sanctions to break
Brazilian and Indian resistance to TRIPS during the Uruguay round negotiations. DRAHOS &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 64, at 133-37 (2002). Even though TRIPS prohibits unilateral
retaliation against non-compliant countries, the United States nevertheless continues to
impose trade sanctions under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act. WATAL, supra note 108, at
58-59.
130. ALSTON & TOMA EVSKI, supra note 128, at 44.
131. Id. at 44-45.
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industries. 
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PART VI - Conclusion
The ever extending scope of patents on gene-modified crop varieties
and the aggressive legal measures employed for their protection by
transnational seed corporations negatively impact farming practices all over
the world. In developing countries, where food security is directly
dependent on the productivity of small and peasant farmers, this will soon
directly affect the human right to adequate food of the local population.
This impact on a human right puts governments under an obligation to
enact intellectual property rights legislation that respects the human right
and protects it against the financial interests of seed corporations.
Although TRIPS and other international agreements place restrictions on
the sovereignty of States in this regard, options still remain as to how States
can reconcile their human rights obligations with their international
obligations to protect intellectual property rights.
At the same time, developing states find themselves under external
and internal pressure to enact stricter norms of IP protection. The external
pressure comes mostly from the United States and other developed
countries, which put political and economic pressure on the governments of
developing countries. The internal pressure comes from local subsidiaries
of transnational corporations which can mobilize substantive resources to
lobby for stricter legislation.
Generally, the most effective way to ensure a State's compliance with
its human rights obligations is to adopt the tactic called "blame and
shame." In the case of IP protection, however, proponents of strong IP
enforcement mechanisms use exactly the same method. They claim a
moral legitimacy for their demands, and label groups and individuals who
infringe intellectual property as "thieves" and even "pirates.' ' 133 States that
do not comply with their standards of IP protection become, in the views of
the IP lobby, accomplices to acts of "theft" and "piracy."
Faced with two opposing obligations that are both claimed to have
moral legitimacy, a State is more likely to choose the one that is backed by
the more forceful enforcement mechanism. Because demands for a high
standard of IP protection are supported by the threat of trade sanctions
under the TRIPS Dispute Settlement Understanding and by-essentially
132. See Joseph E. Stiglitz., Intellectual Property Rights: Why They Are so Wrong, THE
STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005.
133. Peter Drahos talks about the strong moral implications that the term "pirate" has.
DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 64, at 25-29.
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illegal 134 -unilateral trade sanctions through the United States, developing
countries will succumb to these demands.
It has been suggested that civil society, and especially NGOs, should
form a counterweight to the political influence and economic power of
developed States and transnational corporations. 135 Watal predicts the
possibility of a revision of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement in favor
of developing countries will depend on the political strength of
environmental NGOs in developed countries.1 36 One way for NGOs to
strengthen their influence is to give their demands a solid legal basis. They
have to show that their position is supported by a recognized "hard" human
right, and not only by "soft" and fuzzy values. Until this happens, the right
to food of people in rural areas of developing countries remains at risk of
being overrun by technological gene changes in agriculture and the
accompanying new standards of IP protection.
134. The TRIPS Agreement outlaws unilateral trade sanctions against non-compliant
countries. Disputes about minimum standards must instead be handled in multilateral
procedures under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. This makes the unilateral trade
sanctions under Section 301 U.S. Trade Act, which are still applied by the United States,
illegal. See CORREA, supra note 101, at 8-9.
135. Peter Drahos advocates that anti-TRIPS NGOs should work their way into policy
committees in order to affect positive changes in patent policy from inside the system.
Drahos & Braithwaite, supra note 57.
136. WATAL, supra note 108, at 371.
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